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Document
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PO-1856
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File #
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PA-990328-2
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Institution/HIC
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Alcohol and Gaming Commission
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Summary
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NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
The Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations (the Ministry) received a request under the
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act). The request was for access to a
copy of all records containing information about complaints made to the Alcohol and Gaming
Commission (the “AGCO”), or its predecessor, the Liquor Licence Board of Ontario (the “LCBO”),
respecting a group of companies.
The AGCO identified 8 responsive records and granted partial access to Records 1 - 5 (printouts
from the AGCO inspection system). The AGCO denied access to portions of the complaint
memorandum (Record 6) based on the exemption in section 21(1) (invasion of privacy), and denied
access to the statements of two police officers (Records 7 and 8) in their entirety, under section
14(2)(a) of the Act (law enforcement report).
The requester (now the appellant) appealed the AGCO’s decision relying on the exceptions to the
prohibition against the disclosure of personal information in section 21(1) of the Act, which are set
forth in sections 21(1)(c) (public record) and (f) (not an unjustified invasion of personal privacy).
A Notice of Inquiry, summarizing the facts and issues in the appeal, was sent initially to the AGCO
and to the last known business addresses of two individuals whose interests may be affected by the
disclosure of the information contained in the records (the affected persons). Despite the efforts of
this office, no response was received from the affected parties. The AGCO submitted
representations which have, with the exception of a portion withheld for confidentiality reasons,
been shared with the appellant. The appellant did not submit representations in response to the
Notice provided to her.
RECORDS:
Three records are at issue in this appeal and all are related to the same investigation. They are:
1. The undisclosed information in Record 6, which is a memorandum regarding a complaint
involving the appellant; and
2. Records 7 and 8, which are two police officers’ statements.
DISCUSSION:
PERSONAL INFORMATION
The section 21(1) personal privacy exemption applies only to information which qualifies as
"personal information", as defined in section 2(1) of the Act. The affected persons, the appellant
and the AGCO were requested to identify whether the information at issue in these records qualifies
as personal information under section 2(1) of the Act. In addition, the parties were asked whether
there are circumstances in which information that is written by, provided by or is associated with the
name of an individual in his or her professional capacity, would be considered to be that person’s
“personal information” within the meaning of section 2(1).
2
[IPC Order PO-1856/January 12, 2001]
The submissions of the AGCO state in general that the records contain information about
identifiable individuals in accordance with section 2(1) of the Act.
The AGCO submits that the information severed from Record 6 identifies individuals who supplied
the LCBO with information that caused an investigation to be commenced against a company. It
also submits that the information is properly characterized as “personal information” as it includes
the individuals’ names, their position titles, and cites their employer and business address. Records
7 and 8 also contain information about the police officers’ employer, how the officers came to be
involved in the investigation, and their actions and observations.
Previous decisions of this office have drawn a distinction between an individual’s personal, and
professional capacity, and found in some circumstances, information associated with a person in his
or her professional capacity will not be considered to be “about the individual” within the meaning
of the section 2(1) definition of “personal information” [Orders P-257, P-427, P-1412, P-1621]. In
past decisions on this subject, this office has taken the approach that information which identifies an
individual in his or her employment, professional or official capacity, or provides a business address
or telephone number, is usually not regarded as personal information.
In Reconsideration Order R-980015, Adjudicator Donald Hale reviewed the history of the
Commissioner’s approach to this issue and the rationale for taking such an approach. He also
extensively examined the approaches taken by other jurisdictions and considered the effect of the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (1997), 148
D.L.R. (4th) 385 on the approach which this office has taken to the definition of personal
information. At page 4, Adjudicator Hale stated:
The distinction between personal information and other information associated with
an identifiable individual has also been considered by the Commissioner in the
context of information relating to an individual’s professional, employment or
official government capacity in both public and private sector settings. The
Commissioner’s orders have established that, as a general rule, a record containing
information generated by or otherwise associated with an individual in the normal
course of performing his or her professional or employment responsibilities, whether
in a public or a private sector setting, is not the individual’s personal information
simply because his or her name appears on the document.
In applying the principles which he described in that order, Adjudicator Hale concluded:
I find that the information associated with the names of the affected persons which is
contained in the records at issue relates to them only in their capacities as officials
with the organizations which employ them. Their involvement in the issues
addressed in the correspondence with the Ministry is not personal to them but, rather,
relates to their employment or association with the organizations whose interests
they are representing. This information is not personal in nature but may be more
appropriately described as being related to the employment or professional
responsibilities of each of the individuals who are identified therein. Essentially, the
3
[IPC Order PO-1856/January 12, 2001]
information is not about these individuals and, therefore, does not qualify as their
“personal information” within the meaning of the opening words of the definition.
I find that the information severed from Record 6, and the information contained in Records 7 and 8,
does not qualify as “personal information” because the information was provided by the individuals
who are named therein in their employment, rather than their personal, capacity. Having found that
these records do not contain personal information, the AGCO cannot rely on the exemptions in
section 21(1).
Because I have found that section 21(1) does not apply to the undisclosed portions of Record 6, and
no other mandatory exemptions apply to this information, I will order that it be disclosed to the
appellant.
I now turn to a discussion of the application of the section 14 (2)(a) exemption to Records 7 and 8.
LAW ENFORCEMENT:
Records 7 and 8 (police officer’s statements)
The AGCO submits that Records 7 and 8 are part of a report that was prepared in the course of a law
enforcement investigation and, therefore, they qualify for exemption under section 14(2)(a) of the
Act. This section reads:
A head may refuse to disclose a record,
(a) that is a report prepared in the course of law enforcement, inspections or
investigations by an agency which has the function of enforcing and
regulating compliance with a law;
In order for a record to qualify for exemption under section 14(2)(a), the AGCO must satisfy each
part of the following three-part test:
1. the record must be a report; and
2. the report must have been prepared in the course of law enforcement,
inspections or investigations; and
3. the report must have been prepared by an agency which has the function of
enforcing and regulating compliance with a law [Orders 200 and P-324].
With respect to parts 2 and 3, previous decisions have established that records similar to the ones at
issue were prepared in the course of law enforcement investigations, by an agency which has the
function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law, the LCBO [Order P-1297].
After reviewing the records and the AGCO’s submissions, however, I am not satisfied that they meet
the definition of “report”. While the word "report" is not defined in the Act, previous orders have
established that a “report” must consist of a formal statement or account of the results of the collation
4
[IPC Order PO-1856/January 12, 2001]
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Legislation
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Subject Index
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Signed by
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Dora Nipp
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Published
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Jan 12, 2001
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Type
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Order
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