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Document
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PO-1657
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/ifq?>
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File #
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PA-980199-1
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Institution/HIC
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Criminal Injuries Compensation Board
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Summary
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NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The requester was charged with but not convicted of a sexual assault. Arising from this matter, the requester's alleged victim (the affected person) applied to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (the Board) under section 5 of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act ( CVCA ) seeking compensation for injuries she claimed she had suffered. Although the affected person's application to the Board was made outside the limitation period prescribed by section 6 of the CVCA , the affected person sought, and the Board granted, a time extension to permit the application under section 6. The Board then held a hearing into the merits of the application, to which the requester and the affected person were parties. The requester did not attend the hearing, but his counsel did so on his behalf. After the hearing, the requester made a request to the Board under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) for access to the following information: copy of the original application for compensation; copy of any letter of time extension for the application; names and titles of the panel members who sat on the Board during the hearing; and names and titles of all in attendance at the hearing. The Board located seven pages of records responsive to the request and granted access in full to pages 3 and 6, and partial access to the remaining five pages. The Board withheld information from pages 1, 2, 4 and 5 based on the exemption at section 21 (personal privacy) of the Act . In addition, the Board advised the requester that the "bottom portion" of page 7 was not responsive to his request. Further, the Board advised the requester that it was waiving any applicable fees for providing access under the Act . The Board did not notify the affected person of the appeal under section 28 of the Act at any time prior or subsequent to granting partial access to the records. The requester, now the appellant, appealed the Board's decision. Later, the Board identified additional records responsive to the request, consisting of a letter granting a time extension (page 8) and a victim impact assessment which had been attached to the affected person's application for compensation (pages 9-15). The Board advised the appellant that it was denying access to these records based on the exemptions at sections 21 and 49(b) of the Act . In particular, the Board cited the factor at section 21(1)(f) ("the personal information is highly sensitive") as a basis for its supplementary decision. The appellant also seeks a review of the Board's supplementary decision. I provided a Notice of Inquiry setting out the issues in the appeal to the appellant, the Board and the affected person. I received representations from the appellant and the Board only. In the Board's representations, it indicates that subsequent to the appeal it received a separate request from the appellant for a copy of the Board's order with respect to the hearing it held into the affected person's application. The Board granted the request and provided the appellant with a copy of this document. The Board indicated that normally, as a party to the proceedings, the appellant would have been provided with a copy of the order, but this was not done due to an administrative oversight. The appellant's counsel confirmed receipt of this document. Since page 7 is the first page of the Board order, I will consider this page as no longer being at issue in this appeal. ISSUES: PERSONAL INFORMATION The first issue which must be decided is whether or not the records contain personal information and, if so, to whom the personal information relates. Under section 2(1) of the Act , "personal information" is defined, in part, to mean recorded information about an identifiable individual, including any identifying number assigned to the individual, and the individual's name where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual [paragraphs (c), (h)]. All of the records at issue in this appeal contain the personal information of both the appellant and the affected person. Disclosure of these records would reveal information about both of these individuals, including their names, addresses and telephone numbers, and information about the alleged incident in which they were both allegedly involved, and information about subsequent events involving both parties, including the Board proceedings. The appellant states that "the above information [referring to the requested records] or in the alternative, parts thereof does not constitute 'personal information' as defined in section 2(1) of the Act ." For the reasons stated above, I do not accept the appellant's submission on this point. DISCRETION TO REFUSE ACCESS TO ONE'S OWN PERSONAL INFORMATION Introduction Section 47(1) of the Act provides individuals with a general right of access to their own personal information in the custody or under the control of an institution. Section 49 provides a number of exceptions to this general right of access. However, this right of access under section 47(1) is not absolute; section 49 provides a number of exceptions to this general right of access to personal information by the individual to whom it relates. In particular, under section 49(b), a head may refuse to disclose to the individual to whom the information relates personal information where the disclosure "would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy". Section 21 provides guidance in determining whether or not disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy. Disclosing the types of personal information listed in section 21(3) is presumed to be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. If one of the presumptions applies, personal information can be disclosed only if it falls under section 21(4) or if the section 23 "public interest override" applies to it [Order M-1154; John Doe v.
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Legislation
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FIPPA
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Section 23
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21(2)(a)
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21(2)(d)
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21(2)(f)
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21(3)(a)
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28(1)(b)
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Subject Index
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Signed by
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David Goodis
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Published
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Feb 15, 1999
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Type
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Order
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Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. All Rights Reserved.
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