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Document
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P-12
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File #
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880024
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Institution/HIC
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Ministry of Community and Social Services This appeal was received pursuant to subsection 50(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1987 , which gives a person who has made a request for access to a record under subsection 24(1)
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Summary
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Order are as follows: 1. On February 26, 1988, the Ministry of Community and Social Services (the "institution") received a request from the appellant, as agent for a landlord, for access to the current address of one of the landlord's former tenants. 2. On February 29, 1988, the institution refused to confirm or deny the existence of a record containing the requested information, pursuant to subsection 21(5) of the Act , which provides that: "a head may refuse to confirm or deny the existence of a record if disclosure of the record would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy." 3. On March 3, 1988, the requester appealed the decision of the institution. I gave notice of the appeal to the institution. 4. Between March 3, 1988, and April 11, 1988, efforts were made by an Appeals Officer and the parties to settle the appeal. A settlement was not effected as both parties maintained their respective positions. 5. On May 11, 1988, notice that I was conducting an inquiry to review the decision of the head was sent to the institution and the appellant. 6. Written representations were received from the appellant and the institution. It should be noted, at the outset, that the purposes of the Act as defined in subsection 1(a) and (b) are: (a) to provide a right of access to information under the control of institutions in accordance with the principles that, information should be available to the public and that necessary exemptions from the right of access should be limited and specific, ..., and (b) to protect the privacy of individuals with respect to personal information about themselves held by institutions... Further, section 53 of the Act provides that the burden of proof that the record falls within one of the specified exemptions in this Act lies upon the head. The issues arising in this appeal are as follows: A. Would disclosure of the requested information (the current address of the former tenant), if it existed in the custody of the institution, constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy for the purposes of section 21 of the Act ? B. If the answer to Issue 'A' is in the affirmative, has the head properly exercised his discretion under subsection 21(5) to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of the record? ISSUE A: Would disclosure of the requested information, (the current address of the former tenant), if it existed in the custody of the institution, constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy for the purposes of section 21 of the Act . Both the appellant and the institution agree that the requested information (the current address of the former tenant) would fall within the definition of personal information under subsection 2(1) of the Act . The institution submits that, if the requested information does exist, disclosing it would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. The institution's position is that names and addresses of individuals are collected by it as part of the administration of social assistance benefits, and, pursuant to subsection 21(3)(c) of the Act , the disclosure of information that "relates to eligibility for social service or welfare benefits or to the determination of benefit levels" is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. The institution further submits, in the alternative, that if it is found that the presumption under subsection 21(3)(c) does not apply, the criteria referred to in subsections 21(2)(f), (h) and (i) exist in this case and support the position that disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. These subparagraphs read as follows: 21.-(2)(f) the personal information is highly sensitive; (h) the personal information has been supplied by the individual to whom the information relates in confidence; and (i) the disclosure may unfairly damage the reputation of any person referred to in the record. Finally, the institution points out that section 23 of the Act reinforces the importance of protecting the privacy of individuals, by restricting the override provisions applicable to section 21 to situations where a "compelling public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the purpose of the exemption." The appellant, on the other hand, argues that the record should be released because "...the disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy" (subsection 21(1)(f)). The appellant contends that the requirements for the presumption under subsection 21(3)(c) of the Act have not been met in this case because, in his view, if the institution has it, the current address of the former tenant "does not relate to eligibility for social service or welfare benefits nor to the determination of benefit levels." The appellant submits that the fact the institution may possess the address of the former tenant does not in itself trigger a presumption that the tenant had applied for or was in receipt of social assistance benefits. In addition to not being a presumed unjustified invasion of personal privacy under subsection 21(3)(c), the appellant also submits that to disclose the record in question would not be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy at all. The appellant identifies subsections 21(2)(d) of the Act as a relevant circumstance a head must consider in determining whether disclosure of personal information constitutes an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. The subparagraph reads as follows: 21.-(2)(d) the personal information is relevant to a fair determination of rights affecting the person who made the request; The appellant submits that subsection 21(2)(d) is relevant in this case, because the landlord requires the address of the former tenant in order to personally serve a Statement of Claim. After considering the submissions of both parties, I find that the requirements f
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Legislation
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FIPPA
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21(1)(d)
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21(2)(d)
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21(3)(c)
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Section 23
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Subject Index
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Signed by
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Sidney Linden
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Published
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Aug 03, 1988
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Type
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Order
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Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. All Rights Reserved.
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