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Document
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PO-1757
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File #
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PA-990252-1
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Institution/HIC
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Ministry of the Solicitor General
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Summary
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BACKGROUND: The appellant's son died suddenly behind the wheel of his car in June 1995. The cause of his death appears to be undetermined at this time, although there have been several possible causes put forth following medical assessment. NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The appellant submitted a request to the Ministry of the Solicitor General (the Ministry) under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) for access to copies of all officers' notes or reports relating to the "motor vehicle accident" on June 9, 1996 in which his son died. The Ministry located responsive records and confirmed that the appellant was not seeking access to records of which he had already received copies. The Ministry attempted to contact four individuals (the affected persons) who were referred to in the records. As a result, one affected person consented to full disclosure of information, one consented to partial disclosure, one did not respond and one could not be located. The Ministry then granted partial access to the records. The Ministry denied access to the remaining records on the basis of the following sections of the Act : facilitate commission of unlawful act - section 14(1)(l); law enforcement report - section 14(2)(a); discretion to refuse requester's own information - section 49(a); and invasion of privacy - sections 49(b)/21(1)(f) with reference to sections 21(2)(f) (highly sensitive), 21(3)(a) (medical information) and (b) (compiled and identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law). The appellant appealed the Ministry's decision. During mediation, the appellant indicated that he had met with the Coroner and had received some information, however he still wishes to pursue access to the severed records. The appellant also confirmed that he was not seeking access to the records for the administration of his son's estate. I sent a Notice of Inquiry to the Ministry and the appellant. I have received representations from both parties. In its representations, the Ministry indicates that it has withdrawn its reliance on the exemption in section 14(2)(a) of the Act . The appellant indicates in his representations that he is not pursuing access to the ten-codes which are contained in the police officers' notebooks. The Ministry has claimed the exemption in section 14(1)(l) for this information only. As a result, the exemptions in sections 14(1)(l), 14(2)(a) and 49(a) are no longer at issue in this appeal. In addition, section 14(1)(l) was the only exemption claimed on page 12 of the OPP officers' notes. Accordingly, this page is no longer at issue in this appeal. RECORDS: The records at issue consist of: a motor vehicle accident statement; portions of pages 2, 4, 5 and 6 of an OPP sudden death report; and portions of three OPP officers' notebook entries relating to the accident. DISCUSSION: PERSONAL INFORMATION Under section 2(1) of the Act , "personal information" is defined as recorded information about an identifiable individual. The witness statement, the sudden death report and the police officers' notes all contain information pertaining to the "motor vehicle accident" in which the appellant's son died. The sudden death report and notebook entries record the details of the involvement of the police who attended at the scene of the accident. The witness statement contains the observations of an individual who witnessed the accident. As such, the records contain recorded information about the appellant's son, witnesses and other identifiable individuals and this qualifies as the personal information of all of these people. Only the officers' notebooks contain information about the appellant and these records contain his personal information as well. It is apparent from the records that the witness was a stranger to the parties involved in the accident. Although a portion of the statement contains identifying information about this individual, such as name, address and telephone number, the body of this person's statement is severable from the identifying information. The statement itself contains no information which would serve to reveal the identity of the witness. In these circumstances, I find that the body of the witness statement does not contain the personal information of the witness and it is severable from that information which does so qualify pursuant to section 10(1) of the Act . INVASION OF PRIVACY Section 47(1) of the Act gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by a government body. Section 49 provides a number of exceptions to this general right of access. Under section 49(b) of the Act , where a record contains the personal information of both the appellant and other individuals and the institution determines that the disclosure of the information would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy, the institution has the discretion to deny the requester access to that information. Where, however, the record only contains the personal information of other individuals, section 21(1) of the Act prohibits an institution from releasing this information unless one of the exceptions in paragraphs (a) through (f) of section 21(1) applies. In the circumstances, the only exception which could apply is section 21(1)(f) which reads: A head shall refuse to disclose personal information to any person other than the individual to whom the information relates except, if the disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. In both these situations, sections 21(2) and (3) of the Act provide guidance in determining whether disclosure of personal information would result in an unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of the individual to whom the information relates. Section 21(2) provides some criteria for the head to consider in making this determination. Section 21(3) lists the types of information whose disclosure is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Section 21(4) refers to certain types of information whose disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. The Divisional Court has stated that once a presumption against disclosure has been established, it cannot be rebutted by either one or a combination of the factors set out in section 21(2) [ John Doe v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 767]. A section 21(3) presumption can be overcome if the personal information at issue falls under section 21(4) of the Act or if a finding is made under section 23 of the Act that a compelling public interest exists in the disclosure of the record in which the personal information is contained which clearly outweighs the purpose of the section 23 exemption. The Ministry orig
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Legislation
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Subject Index
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Signed by
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Laurel Cropley
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Published
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Feb 17, 2000
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Type
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Order
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2013
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. All Rights Reserved.
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