Document

PO-2298

Institution/HIC  Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee
Summary  NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee (the PGT) received a request under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act (the Act ) for a copy of the entire file for 14 named deceased individuals (PGT file numbers 2741 to file 2754). The PGT and the appellant agreed that the PGT would process each requested file separately. With respect to one of the identified individuals, the PGT issued a decision advising that access to all responsive records was denied pursuant to section 13 (advice or recommendations) and section 21(1) (invasion of privacy) with reference to sections 21(3)(a) and 21(3)(f). The requester (now the appellant) appealed the PGT’s decision. During the mediation stage the PGT identified the specific records for which section 13 was claimed. The PGT also confirmed that it was relying on section 21(1) to deny access to all of the records. Furthermore, it referred to section 21(3)(d) as an additional presumption that applied to certain records. Mediation did not resolve this appeal and it was transferred to the inquiry stage of the process. I sent a Notice of Inquiry to the PGT, initially, and received representations in response. I then sent the Notice of Inquiry, together with a copy of the PGT’s representations, to the appellant, who also provided representations. RECORDS: There are 63 pages of records at issue in this appeal. They include correspondence, file processing documents, notes to file, and bank account and financial records. The PGT takes the position that section 21(1) applies to all of the records, and that section 13(1) applies to pages 9, 28-30 and 32-34. DISCUSSION: PERSONAL INFORMATION The section 21 personal privacy exemption applies only to information which qualifies as "personal information", as defined in section 2(1) of the Act . "Personal information" is defined, in part, to mean recorded information about an identifiable individual, and includes the following specific types of information: (a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation or marital or family status of the individual, (b) information relating to the education or the medical, psychiatric, psychological, criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved, (c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual, (d) the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual, (f) correspondence sent to an institution by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to that correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence, (g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual, and (h) the individual's name where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual; The PGT submits that the records contain personal information, and has identified over 20 different categories of personal information contained in the records relating to the deceased individual. These categories include specifics concerning the birth, life, addresses, employment, identifying numbers (including Social Insurance numbers and Health Card number), medical information, assets, financial dealings, other information from government record depositories and information concerning the death of the deceased. The PGT takes the view that all such records fall within the definition of “personal information” contained in section 2(1) of the Act . Furthermore, the PGT identifies that some of the records also contain information about third parties, including individuals who were friends of the deceased, or individuals who were employed or worked for third party organizations such as financial institutions. The appellant concedes that much of the information may qualify as personal information as defined by section 2(1) of the Act . In my view, the information contained in the records constitutes the personal information of the deceased, as identified by the PGT. In addition, some information constitutes the personal information of other identifiable individuals, such as the friends of the deceased. However, information relating to the people who worked for the financial institutions referred to in the records does not constitute the personal information of those individuals, unless there is a “personal” element to the information (see Order MO-1180). Information relating strictly to these individuals in their professional capacity is not their personal information. Accordingly, I find that the records at issue contain the personal information of the deceased, and that some of the records also contain the personal information of other identifiable individuals. Section 2(2) of the Act states: Personal information does not include information about an individual who has been dead for more than thirty years. The deceased died in the year 2000, so section 2(2) has no application to his personal information. I also have nothing to indicate that any of the other individuals whose personal information is contained in the records has been dead for more than 30 years. INVASION OF PRIVACY Where an appellant seeks the personal information of another individual, section 21(1) of the Act prohibits an institution from disclosing this information unless one of the exceptions in paragraphs (a) through (f) of section 21(1) applies. Section 21(1)(c) - public record The appellant submits that the information at issue is not exempt due to the application of the exception at section 21(1)(c) which reads: A head shall refuse to disclose personal information to any person other than the individual to whom the information relates, except, personal information collected and maintained specifically for the purpose of creating a record available to the general public; The appellant takes the position that the personal information contained in the records is used to prepare a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee (CAET), which is a document that has previously been made available to the public. On this basis, the appellant submits that much of the information is the same information which will be publicly available. The appellant also states that access to the information contained in the CAET is publicly available, and used to be easily accessible, but that access to such records is now more difficult for parties such as the appellant. The appellant refers to the difficulties he has encountered in accessing these documents due to both the excessive fees involved, and the actions of the PGT. Previous orders have stated that in order to satisfy the requirements of section 21(1)(c), the personal information must have been collected and maintained specifically for the purpose of creating a record available to the general public (for example, Order P-318). With respect to the specific types of records at issue in this appeal, Senior Adjudicator Goodis examined this issue in Order PO-1736 [upheld on judicial review in
Legislation
  • FIPPA
  • 21(1)(c)
  • 21(1)(f)
  • 21(2)(h)
  • 21(3)(a)
  • 21(3)(f)
Subject Index
Published  Jun 30, 2004
Type  Order
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