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O R D E R BACKGROUND: This is the Final Order in the matter of Appeal Number 890058, dealt with in part in Interim Order 200 dated October 11, 1990. The appellant had filed two complaints of discrimination with the Ontario Human Rights Commission (the "institution") and wants access to the contents of those complaint files. Interim Order 200 dealt with a number of the records at issue in the appeal. The head was ordered to disclose Records 1-3, 7, 8, 10, 15-17, 36, 38-43, 45, 50-51, 55, and 58-59 in their entirety and Record 5 with the last paragraph of the second page severed. In Provision 1 of the Interim Order, the head was ordered to exercise her discretion pursuant to section 49(a) of the Act with respect to the disclosure of Records 4.2, 18-19, 21-24, 31-33, 35.2, 46, 48, 52-54, 56 and 57 in their entirety as well as the last paragraph of the second page of Record 5. Further, in Provision 2 of the Interim Order, the head was ordered to provide further representations with respect to the application of section 49(b) of the Act in relation to Records 4.1, 4.2, 6, 9, 11-14, 18-34, 35.1, 35.2, 37, 44, 46-49, 52-54, 62-63 and 67. Representations were received from the institution on both issues. Attempts by the Appeals Officer to locate certain persons whose interests might be affected by the outcome of the appeal were unsuccessful. SUBMISSIONS/CONCLUSION: The issues to be dealt with in this Final Order are as follows: A. Whether the exemption provided by section 49(b) of the Act applies to the records; and B. Whether the head properly exercised the discretion provided by section 49(a) of the Act . DISCUSSION: ISSUE A : Whether the exemption provided by section 49(b) of the Act applies to the records. The record numbers used throughout this Order are the same as those used in Interim Order 200. For ease of reference, Appendix "A" to Interim Order 200 is attached. In Interim Order 200, I found that Records 4.1, 4.2, 6, 9, 11-14, 18-34, 35.1, 35.2, 37, 44, 46-49, 52-54, 62-63 and 67 contained personal information about the appellant and other individuals. As a result, I ordered the head to provide me with further representations on the application of section 49(b) to these records. Section 49(b) of the Act provides that: A head may refuse to disclose to the individual to whom the information relates personal information, (b) where the disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy; Section 49(b) of the Act introduces a balancing principle. The head must look at the information and weigh the requester's right of access to his/her own personal information against another individual's right to the protection of his/her personal privacy. If the head determines that release of the information would constitute an unjustified invasion of the other individual's personal privacy, then section 49(b) gives the head the discretion to deny access to the personal information of the requester. Sections 21(2) and (3) of the Act provide guidance in determining if disclosure of personal information would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. The head submitted that the disclosure of the personal information contained in the records would constitute a presumed unjustified invasion of personal privacy under sections 21(3)(b) and (d). I will first consider section 21(3)(b) which reads as follows: A disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy where the personal information, (b) was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation; As stated in the Interim Order, I have found that investigations into complaints made under the Human Rights Code, 1981 , S.O. 1981 c.53 (the "Code") are properly considered law enforcement matters. Further, I have found that the investigations may lead to proceedings before a Board of Inquiry under the Code, and that such proceedings are properly considered law enforcement matters. If there has been a violation, the Code provides that a penalty or sanction could be imposed. I am of the view that the personal information contained in the records was compiled and is part of an investigation into a possible violation of law and accordingly, the requirements for a presumed unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of other individuals under section 21(3)(b) have been satisfied. It is therefore not necessary for me to consider the requirements of the presumption contained in section 21(3)(d). Section 21(4) outlines a number of circumstances which, if they exist, could operate to rebut a presumption under section 21(3). In my view, these records do not contain any information that pertains to section 21(4). In Order 20, former Commissioner Linden stated that: ...a combination of circumstances set out in section 21(2) might be so compelling as to outweigh a presumption under section 21(3). However, in my view such a case would be extremely unusual. The institution submits that it has considered section 21(2) and has not found a combination of circumstances which would rebut the presumption raised by section 21(3)(b). I agree. As the release of the information would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy, section 49(b) gives the head the discretion to deny access to the personal information of the requester. In weighing the appellant's right to access to his own personal information against the right to privacy of other individuals, I am satisfied that the head exercised her discretion in accordance with proper legal principles and I uphold the decision of the head to deny access to the records. ISSUE B : Whether the head properly exercised the discretion provided by section 49(a) of the Act . In Interim Order 200, I found that Records 4.2, 18-19, 21-24, 31-33, 35.2, 46, 48, 52 and 53 would qualify for exemption under section 14(2)(a) subject to the head's exercise of discretion under
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