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Document
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PO-1679
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File #
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PA-980333-1
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Institution/HIC
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Ontario Lottery Corporation
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Summary
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NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice (General Division) that a certain lottery ticket was held in 50/50 partnership between the person who claimed the lottery prize and another individual. This other individual made a request to the Ontario Lottery Corporation (the OLC) under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) to view the original winning ticket. The requester included a copy of the Court of Appeal decision as well as a photocopy of the front and back of winning ticket. The name, address, telephone number and signature of the person who claimed the prize appear on the back of the ticket. The OLC denied the request, claiming that it would not be reasonably practicable to allow the requester to view the original ticket (section 30(2) of the Act ), taking into account "the preservation and integrity" of the record as an important factor. The OLC also claimed that disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of the person who claimed the prize (the affected person), pursuant to section 21(1) of the Act . The requester, now the appellant, appealed this decision. During mediation, the appellant agreed to the following process in order to address the security concerns raised by the OLC: (1) the viewing would take place at a meeting attended by the appellant, his lawyer, the Mediator and any required staff of the OLC; (2) the meeting would take place wherever the OLC deemed appropriate and most secure; (3) the appellant would not touch or handle the ticket in any way; and (4) the ticket would be placed behind glass, as long as the appellant was given the opportunity to view both sides of the ticket. Also during mediation, the Mediator notified the affected person to determine if she would consent to the appellant viewing the record. The affected person did not consent. I sent a Notice of Inquiry to the OLC, the appellant and the affected person. Representations were received from the OLC and the appellant. DISCUSSION: PERSONAL INFORMATION/INVASION OF PRIVACY "Personal information" is defined in section 2(1) of the Act , in part, as follows: "personal information" means records information about an identifiable individual, including, ... (d) the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual. ... (h) the individual's name where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual; The appellant and the OLC both agree that the name, address and telephone number constitute the personal information of the affected person. I concur. I also find that the fact that this information is contained on a winning lottery ticket reveals personal information about the affected person. The appellant explains that the original ticket may include markings which could have assisted in establishing his interest in the ticket. The appellant also points out that he "was found by the Courts to have been an owner of a 50% interest in the ticket, with the affected person." The Courts have determined that the appellant has a personal property interest in the original ticket and, in the particular and unique circumstances of this appeal, I find that the original ticket contains or would reveal personal information about the appellant. Section 47(1) of the Act gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by a government body. Section 49 provides a number of exceptions to this general right of access. Under section 49(b) of the Act , where a record contains the personal information of both the appellant and another individual, and an institution determines that disclosure of the information would constitute an unjustified invasion of the other individual's personal privacy, the institution has the discretion to deny the appellant access to that information. In this situation, the appellant is not required to prove that the disclosure of the personal information would not constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual. Since the appellant has a right of access to his own personal information, the only situation under section 49(b) in which he can be denied access to the information is if it can be demonstrated that the disclosure of the information would constitute an unjustified invasion of the affected person's privacy. Sections 21(2) and (3) of the Act provide guidance in determining whether disclosure would result in an unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of the affected person. Section 21(2) provides some criteria for the head to consider in making this determination. Section 21(3) lists the types of information whose disclosure is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. The Ontario Court of Justice (Divisional Court) determined in the case of John Doe v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 767, that the only way in which a section 21(3) presumption can be overcome is if the personal information at issue falls under section 21(4) or where a finding is made under section 23 of the Act that there is a compelling public interest in disclosure of the information which clearly outweighs the purpose of the section 21 exemption. If none of the presumptions in section 21(3) apply, the OLC must consider the application of the factors listed in section 21(2), as well as all other considerations that are relevant in the circumstances of the case. The OLC states that the presumption in section 21(3)(f) applies. This section reads as follows: A disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy where the personal information, describes an individual's finances, income, assets, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities, or creditworthiness; The OLC submits: It is the OLC's concern that disclosure in this instance, despite the related Court proceedings, remains disclosure of confidential prize winner information into the public domain. ... While the related Court proceedings in this case may appear to complicate this matter, OLC has seen nothing in this case that would allow it to disclose information belonging to a legitimate prize winner. The OLC adds that, "[w]hile it may be the case that a copy of the record is in the possession of the appellant, that fact, in and of itself, does not negate whether section 21(3)(f) applies to this information." As stated earlier, the affected person submitted no representations on this or any other issue identified in the Notice of Inquiry. The appellant submits that because he is in possession of a copy of the record, its contents are known to him, and he would not be obtaining any new information about the affected person by viewing the original record. Several previous orders of this Office have considered whether information that an appellant was previously aware of, or which was provided to or received from an appellant by an institution, should be subject to a presumption against non-disclosure (eg. Orders M-444, M-613,
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Legislation
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FIPPA
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21(2)
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21(3)(f)
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30(2)
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49(b)
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Subject Index
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Signed by
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Tom Mitchinson
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Published
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May 14, 1999
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Type
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Order
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