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Document
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M-444
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Institution/HIC
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Metropolitan Toronto Police Services Board
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Summary
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NATURE OF THE APPEAL: This is an appeal under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ). The appellant submitted a request under the Act to the Metropolitan Toronto Police Services Board (the Police), for the following information: (1) all information in the Police file under his name, and (2) the names of all individuals who have requested access to the contents of his file and the names of all individuals to whom such access has been granted. The Police denied access to these records on the basis that they do not exist. After a telephone conversation with the appellant, in which the appellant indicated that he had been interviewed by the Police in connection with a specified investigation, the Police located three records relating to this interview and granted partial access to each of them. These records consist of a Supplementary Report, which records the interview of the appellant conducted by the Police, and two handwritten statements written and signed by the appellant. The Police do not view these records as responsive to item (1) because they were not in a police file under the appellant's name. The Police rely upon the following exemption to deny access to the parts of these records which were not disclosed: invasion of privacy - section 14(1). The appellant has appealed this denial of access. He also maintains that additional records exist, which raises the issue of whether the Police conducted a reasonable search for records in the circumstances of this appeal. A Notice of Inquiry was sent to the appellant and the Police. Representations were received from both parties. Because the records which were partly withheld from disclosure appear to contain the appellant's personal information, the Commissioner's office raised the possible application of section 38(b) of the Act . That section provides an exemption relating to unjustified invasions of privacy for records which contain the requester's own personal information. DISCUSSION: INVASION OF PRIVACY Under section 2(1) of the Act , "personal information" is defined, in part, to mean recorded information about an identifiable individual, including any identifying number assigned to the individual and the individual's name where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual. I have reviewed the three records identified by the Police. In my view, all of them contain the appellant's personal information. In addition, all of these records contain personal information pertaining to several other individuals. Under section 38(b) of the Act , where a record contains the personal information of both the appellant and other individuals and the institution determines that the disclosure of the information would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy, the institution has the discretion to deny the requester access to that information. Sections 14(2), (3) and (4) of the Act provide guidance in determining whether the disclosure of personal information would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Where one of the presumptions found in section 14(3) applies to the personal information found in a record, the only way such a presumption against disclosure can be overcome is where the personal information falls under section 14(4) or where a finding is made that section 16 of the Act applies to the personal information. As previously noted, the records consist of a Supplementary Report, which records an interview of the appellant conducted by the Police, and two handwritten statements written and signed by the appellant. The only information in these records which has not been disclosed consists of the names of several individuals supplied by the appellant to establish his reputation, or his whereabouts at the time of the crime which the Police were investigating. In two cases, access was also denied to the job titles of the named individuals. A number of previous orders have held that the disclosure of personal information relating to an individual other than the requester, in circumstances where the person requesting the information had originally supplied it to the government organization, would not result in an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. For example, in Order M-384, Inquiry Officer Laurel Cropley held that the disclosure of personal information in a police officer's notebook, which related to someone other than the requester, but which the requester had provided to the officer, would not be an unjustified invasion of privacy. I agree with Inquiry Officer Cropley's interpretation and adopt it for the purposes of this appeal. The circumstances of this appeal are similar to those in Order M-384, and I find that disclosure of the severed information in the records would not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Accordingly, the exemption in section 38(b) does not apply to it. In my view, this is sufficient to dispose of the matter. However, the Police have raised the possible application of the presumptions in sections 14(3)(b) and (d). These provisions state: A disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy if the personal information, (b) was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation; (d) relates to employment or educational history; The undisclosed information to which section 14(3)(d) might be expected to apply consists of the job titles of two named individuals. The employers of these individuals are also identified, although that information was disclosed. It was established in Order P-235 that an individual's name, job title, and the identity of his or her employer does not constitute that person's employment history for the purposes of section 21(3)(d) of the provincial Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act , which is the equivalent of section 14(3)(d) of the Act . I agree with this view and, for this reason, I find that section 14(3)(d) does not apply to this information. Turning to the presumption in section 14(3)(b), the evidence shows that the undisclosed information was compiled and is identifiable as pa
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Legislation
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MFIPPA
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14(3)(b)
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14(3)(d)
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22(1)(a)
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Subject Index
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Published
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Jan 17, 1995
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Type
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Order
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2013
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. All Rights Reserved.
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