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ORDER BACKGROUND: The Metropolitan Toronto Police Services Board (the Police) received a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) for all information concerning an investigation of the requester's complaint of being assaulted by a named individual (the primary affected person). The Police provided the requester with partial access to the records and denied access to the remainder of the records pursuant to sections 8(1)(d) and (1), 8(2)(a), 9(1)(d), 14(2)(h), 14(3)(b) and (d), and 38(b) of the Act . The requester appealed the decision. The Police initially identified 124 pages of occurrence and supplementary police reports, copies from police officer's notebooks, Crown brief material, and correspondence as constituting the records responsive to the request. Attempts to mediate this appeal were not successful. Accordingly, notice that an inquiry was being conducted to review the decision was sent to the appellant, the Police, the primary affected person and three other individuals (the affected persons). Representations were received from the Police, the appellant, the primary affected person and one other affected person. Both the primary affected person and the other affected person who responded to the Notice of Inquiry objected to the disclosure of their personal information. On August 6, 1993, while these representation were being considered, Commissioner Tom Wright issued Order M-170 which interpreted several statutory provisions of the Act in a way which differed from the interpretation developed in previous orders. Since a new approach to the operation of the Act was being adopted and because the same statutory provisions are at issue in the present appeal, it was determined that copies of Order M-170 should be provided to all the parties. The parties were then afforded the opportunity to state whether the contents of Order M-170 would cause them to change or supplement the representations which they had previously made. None of the parties chose to do so. PRELIMINARY ISSUE: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms In his representations, the appellant contends that all of the exemptions claimed by the Police under the Act "are subordinated by the authority" of sections, 7, 12 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter ), and refusal to disclose the records breaches the appellant's rights under the Charter . In Order 106, former Commissioner Sidney B. Linden considered whether the use of section 14(3) of the provincial Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act was in violation of a Charter right. He stated the following: In my view, even if I were to conclude that I have the jurisdiction to hear and determine a Charter challenge to the validity of provisions of the Act , I would have to be convinced by a clear and compelling argument that the section the appellant seeks to impugn is, in fact, inconsistent with the Charter . The section that the appellant seeks to challenge is part of a comprehensive statutory scheme. Given the unique nature of the subject matter addressed by the Act , the role of an independent Commissioner is an integral part of this scheme. It is an important part of the role of the Commissioner to ensure that the potential abuses the appellant has referred to do not occur. To that end, the Commissioner has the statutory authority to make a binding Order in an appeal and has other significant powers with respect to the conduct of an inquiry under section 52 of the Act . These powers include the ability to require production and examination of any record in the custody or control of an institution and the right to enter the premises of an institution. After considering the appellant's submission in that appeal, the former Commissioner was not convinced that section 14(3) of the provincial Act was in conflict with any Charter provision. In Order P-254, Commissioner Tom Wright considered various decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada made after the issuance of Order 106 (i.e., Tetrault-Gadoury v. Canada (Canada Employment and Immigration Commission (1991), 122 N.R. 361, (S.C.C.), Cuddy Chicks Limited v. (Ontario) Labour Relations Board , (1991) 81 D.L.R. (4th) 358 (S.C.C.), and Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College , [1990] 3.S.C.R.570), and concluded that he had the jurisdiction to determine Charter issues. Therefore, I have assumed that I have jurisdiction to determine a Charter challenge to provisions of the Act arising in matters properly before me. I agree with former Commissioner Linden's view as expressed in Order 106 that I would have to be convinced by a clear and compelling argument that the sections which the appellant seeks to impugn are, in fact, inconsistent with the Charter . I have considered the appellant's submissions with respect to the applicability of the Charter in the circumstances of this appeal. As I have stated, it is necessary for the party who raises such issues to provide sufficient support for them. Based on the submissions received from the appellant, I am not persuaded that the provisions of the exemptions used by the Police under the Act in this appeal offend the Charter in any way. The Records The Police claim that many of the pages contain information which is not responsive to the request. I agree. I have examined the records and, in my opinion, the following 38 pages are either not responsive to the request or have been released to the appellant with non-disclosure only of information which is not responsive: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 24, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123 and 124. As these pages are not in issue, I need not consider the application of sections 8(1)(l) and 9(1)(d) of the Act claimed by the Police to apply to non-responsive pages. A further nine pages contain some information which is not responsive, as well as additional information that is responsive to the request, but was severed pursuant to an exemption of the Act . They are pages 6, 8, 19, 22, 23, 27, 29, 33, and 53 parts of which are, therefore, still at issue. I should add that I agree with the Police, as stated in their representations, that the Police code on page 53 is not responsive to th
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