This inquiry involves five appeals under section 39(1) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) from decisions of the London Police Services Board (the London Board) to deny the appellant Robert Riley's (Riley) requests for certain records.

As a preliminary issue in each of these appeals, the London Board takes the position that Riley's requests and resulting appeals are "frivolous", "vexatious", "an abuse of the right of access" and "an abuse of process". Based on this position, the London Board asks that I uphold its decisions denying Riley access to the requested information, or, alternatively, that I impose reasonable limits on Riley which will prevent or remedy the alleged abuse.

Riley takes the position that the Act does not permit me to assess requests on the basis of whether they are an abuse of process as defined by the London Board. Rather, he submits that I may only assess requests on the basis of the specific exemptions from the right of access to information set out in sections 6 to 15 of the Act, and that to accept the London Board's submissions would be beyond my jurisdiction.

I will as briefly as possible outline the history of events leading to this order since they are important to an understanding of the issues now before me.