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Document
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MO-1196
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/ifq?>
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Institution/HIC
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London Police Services Board
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Summary
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NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The London Police Services Board (the Police) received a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) for a copy of the police report in relation to the death of the appellant's sister. The requester enclosed a copy of the Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee Without a Will, appointing him as his sister's estate trustee. The responsive record identified by the Police is 71 pages in length, and consists of Occurrence Reports, Witness Statements, a Coroner's Warrant, a Report of the Centre of Forensic Sciences, E-mails, a General Incident Report and a Property Return Authorization Form. The Police denied access to the entire record pursuant to sections 8(1)(d), (l), 8(2)(a), 14(1), and 38(a) and (b) of the Act . The Police later added sections 8(1)(c) and (h) and section 9(1)(d) as additional exemption claims during the 35-day period permitted for the late raising of discretionary exemptions. The Police also pointed out the potential availability of section 54(a) of the Act , which provides: Any right or power conferred on an individual by this Act may be exercised, if the individual is deceased, by the individual's personal representative if exercise of the right or power relates to the administration of the individual's estate; The requester, now the appellant, appealed the decision of the Police. Following unsuccessful mediation efforts, a Notice of Inquiry was sent to the Police and the appellant. Representations were received from both parties. In their representations, the Police state that they will not be making representations on the application of section 8(1)(c). Accordingly, this exemption is no longer at issue. DISCUSSION: LAW ENFORCEMENT Section 8(2)(a) reads as follows: A head may refuse to disclose a record, that is a report prepared in the course of law enforcement, inspections or investigations by an agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law; Only a report is eligible for exemption under this section. The word "report" is not defined in the Act . For a record to be a report, it must consist of a formal statement or account of the results of the collation and consideration of information (Order P-200). Generally speaking, results would not include mere observations or recordings of fact (Order M-1048). The Police submit that the record is the complete account of an investigation of a sudden death, and is a report compiled by the Police, which has the function of enforcing the law pursuant to the Police Services Act . Having reviewed the various documents which comprise the record, I find that they neither collectively nor individually qualify as a "report". These documents consist almost exclusively of factual information provided by the individuals involved, together with observations by the investigating police officers. They do not contain a formal statement or account of the results of the collation and consideration of information. Rather, the contents are more appropriately described as a collection and recitation of "observations and recordings of fact". Therefore, I find that the record does not qualify as a "law enforcement report" and section 8(2)(a) does not apply, regardless of the fact that the record was prepared during the course of a criminal law enforcement investigation by an agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with the law. PERSONAL INFORMATION Section 2(1) of the Act defines "personal information", in part, as recorded information about an identifiable individual. As stated earlier, the documents which comprise the record all pertain to the investigation into the death of the appellant's sister. As such, I find that all 71 pages contain the personal information of the deceased. Certain portions of the record include witness statements and personal identifiers of the witnesses, such as names, addresses, telephone numbers and dates of birth, and I find that these portions also contain the personal information of these individuals. Finally, pages 11, 14, 52, 56, 58 and 66 contain information which identifies the appellant as the deceased's next of kin, and the contact person for the return of the deceased's personal property, and I find that these pages also contain the appellant's personal information. Section 2(2) provides that personal information does not include information about an individual who has been dead for more than 30 years. Because the deceased died in 1997, section 2(2) has no application in this case. RIGHT OF ACCESS BY A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE Under section 54(a), the appellant would be able to exercise the deceased's right to request and be granted access to the deceased's personal information if he is able to: demonstrate that he is the "personal representative" of the deceased; and demonstrate that his request for access "relates to the administration of the deceased's estate". Personal Representative In Order M-919, former Adjudicator Anita Fineberg reviewed the law with respect to section 54(a) and came to the following conclusions: The meaning of the term "personal representative" as it appears in section 66(a) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act , the equivalent of section 54(a) of the Act , was considered by the Divisional Court in a judicial review of Order P-1027 of this office. In Adams v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1996), 136 D.L.R. (4th) 12 at 17-19, the court stated: Although there is no definition of "personal representative" in the Act, when that phrase is used in connection with a deceased and the administration of a deceased's estate, it can have only one meaning, which is the meaning set out in the definition contained in the Estates Ad
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Legislation
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MFIPPA
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14(1)
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14(3)(b)
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2(1) personal information
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2(2)
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54(a)
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8(2)(a)
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Subject Index
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Published
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Mar 16, 1999
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Type
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Order
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