Document

M-952

Institution/HIC  Waterloo Regional Police Services Board
Summary  NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The appellant is the father of an eight year old girl. Every two weeks, onthe weekends, he sees the child in supervised access visits. Beginning inOctober of 1993, the appellant complained to Family and Children Services andto different Police authorities that his daughter was being emotionally andphysically abused by her mother, as well as by her maternal grandparents. Allof the allegations were investigated by the different authorities and were notsubstantiated. In March of 1996, the appellant again made a similar allegation of childabuse to the Waterloo Regional Police Services Board (the Police). Theappellant's statements of the allegations were videotaped by the Police. Afterquestioning the appellant, the Police decided not to pursue the appellant'scomplaint. The appellant subsequently requested a copy of the videotape. The requestwas made to the Police pursuant to the Municipal Freedom of Information andProtection of Privacy Act (the Act ). The Police denied access to the videotape in its entirety. The videotapewas withheld on the basis of the following exemptions in the Act: law enforcement report - section 8(2) (a) law enforcement record - section 8(2)(c) threat to health and safety of an individual - section 13 invasion of privacy - sections 14(1) and 38(b) discretion to refuse access to requester's own information - section 38(a) The appellant filed an appeal of the decision of the Police to deny himaccess to the videotape. A Notice of Inquiry was sent to the Police, the appellant, the child'smother on her own behalf, as well as on behalf of the eight year old girl andto the child's maternal grandparents (the "affected parties"). Representations were received from all of the parties except for the maternalgrandfather. The grandmother, in her representations, however, spoke about theimpact that disclosure of the videotape could conceivably have on her husband. DISCUSSION: INVASION OF PRIVACY "Personal information" is defined in section 2(1) of the Act ,in part, as recorded information about an identifiable individual. I haveviewed the videotape and find that it contains the personal information of theappellant, his daughter, the child's mother and the maternal grandparents. Section 36(1) of the Act allows individuals access to their ownpersonal information held by a government institution. However, section 38 setsout exceptions to this right. Where a record contains the personal information of both the appellant andother individuals, section 38(b) of the Act allows the institution towithhold information from the record if it determines that disclosing thatinformation would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy. On appeal, I must be satisfied thatdisclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of anotherindividual's personal privacy. The appellant is not required to prove thecontrary. Sections 14(2), (3) and (4) provide guidance in determining whetherdisclosure of personal information would constitute an unjustified invasion ofpersonal privacy. Disclosing the types of personal information listed insection 14(3) is presumed to be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Ifone of the presumptions applies, the institution can disclose the personalinformation only if it falls under section 14(4) or if section 16 applies to it. If none of the presumptions in section 14(3) apply, the institution mustconsider the factors listed in section 14(2), as well as all other relevantcircumstances. In their representations, the Police submit that sections 14(2) and (3) ofthe Act apply to the personal information on the videotape. They do notrefer to any particular subsection or explain how the sections might apply. Having reviewed the contents of the videotape, it is my view that thepresumption in section 14(3)(a) applies to some of the personal information. This section states: A disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute anunjustified invasion of personal privacy if the personal information, relates to a medical, psychiatric or psychological history, diagnosis,condition, treatment or evaluation; On the videotape, the appellant and the Police discuss some of the reportspreviously prepared by professionals who have assessed the appellant, hisdaughter and her mother. The reports contain psychological evaluations of theseparties. In my view, the presumption in section 14(3)(b) (compiled as part of aninvestigation into a possible violation of law) does not apply. The Police didnot pursue the appellant's latest complaint as recorded on the videotape. Therefore, it cannot be said that the personal information on the videotape wascompiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation intoa possible violation of law. There was no investigation. The submissions of the Police and the affected parties may, however, becharacterized as relating to some of the circumstances set out in section 14(2)of the Act which weigh in favour of privacy protection. The Police state that the appellant continues to pursue the issue of childabuse, even after being informed by professionals that there is insufficientevidence to support his allegations. They also submit that these allegationsare causing emotional strain on his daughter and exacerbating her condition. The Police maintain that disclosure of the videotape could unfairly damage thereputation of the affected persons. In her representations, the mother of the child states that she fears thatif the appellant persists in making such allegations, her daughter will never beable to put this negative experience behind her and will be irreparably scarredin some way. The grandmother emphasizes the considerable stress, both physicaland mental, as well as financial, the appellant's accusations have placed on thefamily. It is clear from the appellant's Letter of Appeal, that he intends tore-open the issue of child abuse concerning his daughter. In his Letter ofAppeal, the appellant explains that he needs the videotape to show that noinvestigation of child abuse of his daughter took place. Yet, in hisrepresentations, the appellant seems to acknowledge that the videotape cannotassist him in substantiating evidence of child abuse. In his representations, the appellant states: The video tape cannot be used by myself as evidence. The statements madeare my own. They deal with my observations and opinions. If this tape could beused as evidence, then all I would have to do is sit in front of a camera andrecord myself. I cannot prove my own points by saying that Iam on video saying the same thing. [my emphasis] I am satisfied that the videotape contains allegations made by the appellantthat hi
Legislation
  • MFIPPA
  • 14(2)(e)
  • 14(2)(f)
  • 14(2)(i)
  • 14(3)(a)
Subject Index
Published  Jun 18, 1997
Type  Order
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