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MO-1321

Document		MO-1321


File #		MA-990337-1


Institution/HIC		Toronto Police Services Board


Summary		NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The appellant submitted a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) to the Toronto Police Services Board (the Police) for access to information as follows: Information or report regarding [a specific residence] originated from a [named complainant] bearing my name as indicated by [named Police employee] - existing dating 1993 or 1994 or any other following years. This is a follow up of my earlier request made 99/10/08. The Police identified a three-page occurrence report as being responsive to the request, and provided partial access to page 3 of the report. The Police stated that pages 1 and 2 in their entirety, and portions of page 3 were being withheld on the basis of section 14(1)(f) (unjustified invasion of personal privacy) and 14(3)(b) (presumption for personal information compiled as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law). The appellant appealed the decision of the Police to this office. The appellant later wrote to this office stating: As a response to my request I had received the third page of a report entitled as "THEFT OVER" prepared by a police officer . . . dated December 19, 1994 in this report [a named complainant] indicated to the police officer that I ... was a suspect in the theft . . . reported at [specific residence] that date. The first two pages I assume were describing what was reported missing and the circumstances. I as an accused person by implication should have the right to this information since earlier a similar report was made on February 22, 1991 during construction at the above address. That time the contractor was implicated by [named complainant] as suspect. [The named complainant] had been [indicted] for fabrication of evidence of this year and it is important that I obtain the missing two pages as further evidence for Court procedure. The appellant also advised this office that he believed there were more records responsive to his request in addition to the one the Police had already identified. I sent a Notice of Inquiry setting out the issues in the appeal to the Police initially. In the Notice of Inquiry I sought representations on the application of section 38(b) in conjunction with section 14, since the records appeared to contain the appellant's personal information. The Police sent representations in response to this Notice of Inquiry. I then sent the non-confidential portions of the representations of the Police, together with a Notice of Inquiry, to the appellant. I received representations from the appellant in response. The record identified by the Police as responsive to the appellant's request is a three-page General Occurrence Report dated December 19, 1994. The information at issue in this appeal consists of all of pages 1 and 2, and the portions of page 3 withheld from the appellant. DISCUSSION: PERSONAL PRIVACY Under section 2(1) of the Act , "personal information" is defined, in part, to mean recorded information about an identifiable individual. The Police submit that the record contains personal information of the appellant, and that this information was already disclosed to the appellant pursuant to his request. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the record contains the appellant's personal information, including his address, age and other information pertaining to the complaint made to the Police. The Police further submit that the record contains information about the complainant and another individual. The appellant makes no specific submissions on this issue. In my view, the record also contains personal information of the complainant and other individuals, including their addresses, date of birth (in one case) and other information pertaining to their involvement in the matter. RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ONE'S OWN PERSONAL INFORMATION/UNJUSTIFIED INVASION OF OTHER INDIVIDUALS' PRIVACY Section 36(1) of the Act gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by a government body. Section 38 provides a number of exceptions to this general right of access. Under section 38(b) of the Act , where a record contains the personal information of both the appellant and other individuals and the institution determines that the disclosure of the information would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy, the institution has the discretion to deny the requester access to that information. Sections 14(2) and (3) of the Act provide guidance in determining whether disclosure of personal information would result in an unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of the individual to whom the information relates. Section 14(2) provides some criteria for the institution to consider in making this determination. Section 14(3) lists the types of information the disclosure of which is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Section 14(4) refers to certain types of information the disclosure of which does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. The Divisional Court has stated that once a presumption against disclosure has been established, it cannot be rebutted by either one or a combination of the factors set out in 14(2) [Order P-1456, citing John Doe v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 767]. The Divisional Court has stated that the only way in which a section 14(3) presumption can be overcome is if the personal information at issue falls under section 14(4) of the Act or where a finding is made under section 23 of the Act that a compelling public interest exists in the disclosure of the record in which the personal information is contained which clearly outweighs the purpose of the section 14 exemption. In this case, the Police have cited section 14(3)(b) in conjunction with section 38(b). Those sections read: 38. A head may refuse to disclose to the individual to whom the information relates personal information, (b) if the disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy;


Legislation		MFIPPA 14(1)(f) 14(2)(a) 17(2) 38(b)


Subject Index		scope of


Signed by		David Goodis


Published		Jul 17, 2000


Type		Order


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