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Document
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MO-1369
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Institution/HIC
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Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Services Board
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Summary
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NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Services Board (the Police) received a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) for " a complete copy of [a numbered report] regarding the circumstances in the sudden death of my son ...". The Police identified a number of responsive records, and notified one individual (affected person #1) to determine whether he would consent to the disclosure of any of his personal information contained in the records. After receiving no response, the Police issued a decision to the requester, denying access on the basis of the following exemptions contained in the Act : section 8(2)(a) - law enforcement section 14(1) - personal privacy sections 38(a) and (b) - discretion to refuse requester's own information The Police referred to the presumptions in sections 14(3)(a) (medical condition or treatment) and 14(3)(b) (investigation into possible violation of law) in support of the section 14(1) exemption claim. The requester, now the appellant, appealed the Police's decision. During the course of mediation, the Police received a belated response from affected person #1, providing his consent. As a result, the Police disclosed a small portion of one of the records to the appellant. During mediation, the appellant confirmed that she is not the executrix of her deceased son's estate, and that section 54(a) of the Act is not relevant in this appeal. Mediation was not successful, and the appeal moved to the inquiry stage. I sent a Notice of Inquiry initially to the Police, and received representations in response. I then sent the Notice to the appellant, along with the non-confidential portion of the Police's representations. The appellant did not provide representations. Efforts were made by this Office to notify a second individual referred to in some of the records (affected person #2), but this person could not be located. RECORDS: There are five records at issue in this appeal, all of which were created by the Police in the context of the investigation into the sudden death of the appellant's son: General Occurrence Report (one page). Person/Vehicle Report (one page). Sudden Death Report (one page). Property Report (one page). General Occurrence/Sudden Death Report (two pages). A small portion of Record 5 was released to the appellant. DISCUSSION: PERSONAL INFORMATION Section 2(1) of the Act defines "personal information", in part, as recorded information about an identifiable individual. The records all pertain to an investigation by the Police into the death of the appellant's son. As such, I find that they all contain the deceased son's personal information. Records 2, 3 and 5 also contain information obtained from or concerning affected person #2. This information consists of information provided by her to the Police, as well as personal identifiers such as her name, address, telephone number and date of birth. I find that Records 2, 3 and 5 contain the personal information of both the deceased son and affected person #2. None of the records contain any of the appellant's personal information, so section 38 of the Act has no application in the circumstances of this appeal. Section 2(2) of the Act provides that personal information does not include information about an individual who has been dead for more than 30 years. Because the appellant's son died in 2000, section 2(2) has no application in this case. INVASION OF PRIVACY Where a requester seeks the personal information of another individual, section 14(1) of the Act prohibits an institution from releasing this information unless one of the exceptions in paragraphs (a) through (f) of section 14(1) applies. The only exception with potential relevance in this appeal is section 14(1)(f) which reads: A head shall refuse to disclose personal information to any person other than the individual to whom the information relates except, if the disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Sections 14(2) and (3) provide guidance in determining whether disclosure would result in an unjustified invasion of privacy. Section 14(2) provides some criteria for an institution to consider in making this determination. Section 14(3) lists the types of information whose disclosure is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, and section 14(4) refers to certain types of information whose disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. In John Doe v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 767, the Divisional Court stated that once a presumption against disclosure has been established under subsection (3), it cannot be rebutted by either one or a combination of the factors set out in subsection (2). This decision was made in the context of sections 21(2) and (3) of the provincial Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act , which are virtually identical to sections 14(2) and (3) of the Act . The Court stated: Having found an unjustified invasion of personal privacy pursuant to s. 21(3)(b), and having concluded that none of the circumstances set out in s. 21(4) existed so as to rebut that presumption, the Commissioner considered both enumerated and unenumerated factors under s. 21(2) in order to rebut the presumption created by s. 21(3). The words of the statute are clear. There is nothing in the section to confuse the presumption in s. 21(3) with the balancing process in s. 21(2). There is no other provision in the Act and nothing in the words of the section to collapse into one process, the two distin
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Legislation
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Subject Index
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Published
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Nov 28, 2000
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Type
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Order
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2013
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. All Rights Reserved.
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