|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Document
|
|
M-144
|
|
|
|
|
|
Institution/HIC
|
|
Metropolitan Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police
|
|
|
|
|
|
Summary
|
|
ORDER BACKGROUND: The Metropolitan Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police (the Police) received a request for access under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) for: ... all personnel records at the Personnel Office level and the unit level; all medical records from the unit and medical office level; all records and reports pertaining to complaint of harassment from the unit level and Labour Relations unit; and all records from the Employment Office of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force with respect [to the requester]. The Police granted partial access to the information requested. Certain records were, however, not provided to the appellant pursuant to sections 8(1)(a) and (b), 8(2)(a), 10(1)(d), 14(1)(f), 14(3)(b) and (d), and 38(b) and (c) of the Act . The requester appealed the denial of access. During mediation, the records at issue were narrowed significantly such that only six pages now remain at issue. These records consist of Employer Reference forms where three of the appellant's former employers have provided information about the appellant's previous work experience. Further mediation was not possible, and notice that an inquiry was being conducted to review the decision of the Police was sent to the Police, the appellant and to three individuals who provided the references (the affected persons). Representations were received from the Police and one affected person only. ISSUES: The issues arising in this appeal are: A. Whether the records contain personal information as defined by section 2(1) of the Act . B. If the answer to Issue A is yes, whether the discretionary exemption provided by section 38(c) of the Act applies to the records. SUBMISSIONS/CONCLUSIONS: ISSUE A: Whether the records contain personal information as defined by section 2(1) of the Act . Section 2(1) of the Act states, in part, as follows: "personal information" means recorded information about an identifiable individual, including, (d) the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual, (g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual, and (h) the individual's name if it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual; In their representations, the Police acknowledge that the Employer Reference forms contain personal information about the appellant. That information relates to the appellant's employment history and to the views or opinions expressed by other individuals about the appellant. The Police also submit that the records contain the personal information of the individuals who supplied the employer references. That information would include the individual's name, his or her employment title, the name of the individual's organization and the individual's work address and telephone number. From a review of the Employer Reference forms, it is clear that they contain the views and opinions of the references about the appellant, in the context of the appellant's previous work history and suitability for new employment. By virtue of sections 2(1)(e) and (g) of the Act , therefore, these views and opinions constitute the personal information of the appellant only. The portions of the records which remain at issue consist of background information provided by the three references about their positions within their respective organizations. It has been established in a number of previous orders that information supplied by individuals in the execution of their employment responsibilities does not fall within the definition of personal information under the Act (Orders 113, 139, 157, P-257, P-326, and P-377). In the circumstances of this appeal, I find that the information in question relates to the employment sphere of the three individuals and was supplied to the Police for a work related purpose. Accordingly, the materials provided do not qualify as the personal information of the individuals involved. ISSUE B: If the answer to Issue A is yes, whether the discretionary exemption provided by section 38(c) of the Act applies to the records. I have found under Issue A that the information being sought qualifies as personal information under the Act and that this information pertains to the appellant only. I must now determine whether access to this information should be denied on the basis that it falls within the exemption provided by section 38(c) of the Act . Section 36(1) of the Act gives individuals a general right of access to personal information about themselves, which is in the custody or under the control of an institution. However, the right of access under section 36(1) is not absolute; section 38 provides a number of exemptions to this general right of access to personal information by the individual to whom it relates. Section 38(c) of the Act reads: A head may refuse to disclose to the individual to whom the information relates personal information, that is evaluative or opinion material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility or qualifications for employment or for the awarding of contracts and other benefits by an institution if the disclosure would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the institution in circumstances where it may reasonably have been assumed that the identity of the source would be held in confidence; As I indicated in Order M-132, section 38(c) of the Act attempts to address two competing interests. These are: (1) the right of an individual to have access to his or her personal information and (2) the need to protect the flow of frank information to provincial or municipal institutions so that appropriate decisions can be made respecting the awarding of jobs, contracts or other benefits. In Order M-132, I established what was, in effect, a four-part test for a record to qualify for exemption under section 38(c) of the Act . For the exemption to be successfully claimed, an institution and/or the affected person must establish that: 1. The personal information is evaluative or opinion material; 2. The personal information was compiled solely for the purpose of
|
|
|
|
|
|
Legislation
|
|
-
MFIPPA
-
2(1) personal information
-
2(1) personal information (d)
-
2(1) personal information (g)
-
2(1) personal information (h)
-
38(c)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Subject Index
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Published
|
|
Jun 11, 1993
|
|
|
|
|
|
Type
|
|
Order
|
|
|
|
|
|
<<
Back
|
|
|
|
Back to Top
|
 |
|
|
|
© Copyright
2013
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. All Rights Reserved.
|