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Document
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MO-1896
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Institution/HIC
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Thunder Bay Police Force
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Summary
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NATURE OF THE APPEAL: In January of 2002, the appellant reported to the Thunder Bay Police Force (the Police) that she had been robbed and assaulted at a casino in Thunder Bay. A Thunder Bay police officer (the investigating officer) began an investigation. He noted physical injuries and arranged to have them photographed. He also contacted an Ontario Provincial Police officer assigned to the Alcohol and Gaming Commission, which operates the casino, for assistance and information. On October 30, 2003, the appellant made an access request to the Thunder Bay Police Force under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) for “the investigation records and all statements made by the (investigating) officer” in relation to that incident. The appellant alleges that these records contain “vulgar and slanderous statements” that she is a “well- known prostitute of TH. Bay and [has] been thrown out of the TH. Bay Charity Casino several times”. The appellant states that she found out about these allegations when she applied to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (the Board) for compensation for harm suffered as a result of the robbery and assault. She states that she became aware of the allegations because they were produced as evidence at the Board hearing by the Thunder Bay Police investigating officer. The Police identified as responsive to the request two records: a “General Occurrence Report” dated January 30, 2002 and a “Supplementary Occurrence Report” dated January 31, 2002. The Police gave the appellant access to most of the contents of the General Occurrence Report, but severed some portions. They also gave her access to the Supplementary Occurrence Report with the exception of two words in the first paragraph, two words in the second paragraph, and two sentences in the third paragraph. The severed information was denied pursuant to the exemption in section 38(b) of the Act (invasion of privacy) and pursuant to section 38(a) in conjunction with the discretionary exemptions in sections 8(1)(a) (law enforcement) and 9(1)(b) (relations with other governments) to the duty to provide an individual with his or her own personal information. The appellant appealed the decision to withhold the severed information. During mediation of this appeal, the appellant agreed to limit the scope of the appeal to the two sentences in the third paragraph of the Supplementary Occurrence Report that the Police refused to disclose. The appellant believes these sentences contain pejorative statements about her described earlier, and identify a person (the affected person) who allegedly made those statements. As the appellant explained in her letter appealing the refusal decision, what she wants is: personal information about myself. ...Why bring up these vicious allegations at the (Board) hearing, and now withhold them? This information was very hurtful to myself, my family, and by the sounds of it, my C.I.C.B. claim. I have been with my husband for 15 years, (married for 10 years), and have a daughter who is 5 years old. I was very shocked when this came out at the hearing, I couldn’t believe it. I was very embarrassed to have this said about me. I have never done anything like this, nor been thrown out of the Casino. (They have me mixed up with someone else). This inquiry was initiated by sending the Police a Notice of Inquiry setting out the facts and issues in this appeal and inviting them to make representations. The Police provided representations, including several attachments. They asked that this office not share portions of their representations and one of the attachments with the appellant. This office complied with that request and did not share that information with the appellant. A copy of the non-confidential portion of the representations of the Police was sent to the appellant, whose counsel made representations in response. The affected person was also invited to make representations in this inquiry, particularly in relation to whether the severed portion of the record contained his personal information. In response, the affected person supplied this office with a document that he had prepared earlier. DISCUSSION: PERSONAL INFORMATION In order to determine which sections of the Act may apply, it is necessary to decide whether the record contains “personal information” and, if so, to whom it relates. That term is defined in section 2(1), in part, as follows: “personal information” means recorded information about an identifiable individual, including, (e) the personal opinions or views of the individual except where they relate to another individual, (g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual, and (h) the individual’s name if it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual; To qualify as personal information, the information must be about the individual in a personal capacity. As a general rule, information associated with an individual in his or her professional, official or business capacity will not be considered to be “about” the individual [Orders P-257, P-427, P-1412, P-1621, R- 980015, MO-1550-F, PO-2225]. Even if information relates to an individual in a professional, official or business capacity, it may still qualify as personal information if the information reveals something of a personal nature about the individual [Orders P-1409, R-980015, PO-2225]. In this case, the information at issue has two components. (1) a statement about the appellant, and (2) the name and title of an official who allegedly made the statement. I find that the statement made about the appellant by the affected person is the appellant’s personal information. The statement falls within the definition of “personal information” in section 2(1) of the Act both because it relates to her alleged criminal history and because it contains the views or opinions of another individual about the appellant. As mentioned earlier, the affected person was contacted by this office and offered an opportunity to provide representations, in particular in relation to the issue of whether the information at issue contains his or her personal information. The affected person provided some information in response, but did not address the “personal information” issue. In the record, the affected person is identified only in his professional capacity and any statements attributed to him appear to relate to the performance of professional responsibilities. The severed portion of the record reveals nothing of a personal nature about him. Indeed, the document he provided to this office reinforces the conclusion that this information relates to him only in a professional capacity. Moreover, under section 2(1)(e), the affected person’s personal views and opinions in relation to the appellant are not his personal information. The identity of the affected person, therefore, and the information that he allegedly provided about the appellant are not the affected person’s personal information. In summary, I find that the record contains the personal information of the appellant but does not contain the personal information of the affected person. DISCRETION TO REFUSE REQUESTER’S OWN INFORMATION/INVASION OF PRIVACY Section 36(1) gives individuals a
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Legislation
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MFIPPA
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2(1) personal information
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38(a)
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8(1)(a)
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9(1)(d)
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Subject Index
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Published
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Dec 31, 2004
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Type
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Order
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