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Document
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MO-1858
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Institution/HIC
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City of Toronto
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Summary
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NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The City of Toronto (the City) received a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) for access to the name of the owner of a specified taxicab licensed by the City. The taxicab was involved in a motor vehicle accident with the requester in 2002. The City located two responsive records and denied access to them, claiming the application of the invasion of privacy exemption in section 14(1) of the Act . The requester, now the appellant, appealed the City’s decision. Mediation of the appeal was not possible and the matter was moved into the adjudication stage of the appeals process. I sought and received the representations of the City, initially. Those submissions were then shared in their entirety with the appellant, along with a Notice of Inquiry. The appellant provided representations which I shared with the City. I also invited the City to submit additional representations by way of reply but received no response. RECORDS: The records consist of two pages, generated from the City’s Municipal Licensing and Standards electronic database. They consist of a Client Inquiry/Update printout and a one-page Plate Inquiry/Update printout. DISCUSSION: PERSONAL INFORMATION What constitutes “personal information”? In order to determine which sections of the Act may apply, it is necessary to decide whether the record contains “personal information” and, if so, to whom it relates. That term is defined in section 2(1) as follows: “personal information” means recorded information about an identifiable individual, including, (a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation or marital or family status of the individual, (b) information relating to the education or the medical, psychiatric, psychological, criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved, (c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual, (d) the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual, (e) the personal opinions or views of the individual except if they relate to another individual, (f) correspondence sent to an institution by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to that correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence, (g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual, and (h) the individual’s name if it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual; The list of examples of personal information under section 2(1) is not exhaustive. Therefore, information that does not fall under paragraphs (a) to (h) may still qualify as personal information [Order 11]. The meaning of “about” the individual To qualify as personal information, the information must be about the individual in a personal capacity. As a general rule, information associated with an individual in a professional, official or business capacity will not be considered to be “about” the individual [Orders P-257, P-427, P-1412, P-1621, R-980015, MO- 1550-F, PO-2225]. Even if information relates to an individual in a professional, official or business capacity, it may still qualify as personal information if the information reveals something of a personal nature about the individual [Orders P-1409, R-980015, PO-2225]. Representations of the parties In support of its decision to deny access to the name of the taxicab license holder, the City relies on my decision in Order MO-1010 in which I held that: . . . the names of [taxi] license holders and agents who are natural persons, along with their addresses, telephone numbers, license numbers, leasing status and the date their license were issued, constitute the personal information of these individuals within the meaning of section 2(1). In the present appeal, the undisclosed information consists of the name of the owner of the taxi license, as well as that of the lessee of the licence and the agent of that individual. The City submits that their names, taken in the context of holding a taxi license, constitutes the personal information of these individuals, as opposed to information about their business activities. The City urges that I follow the reasoning set forth in Order MO-1010 in which I found that information about a taxicab license holder, including his name, qualifies as the personal information of that individual. The City also submits that the information falls within the ambit of sections 2(1)(b), (d) and (h) of the definition referred to above. The appellant, on the other hand, submits that he is only seeking access to the name of the license owner and not to any other information about this or any other individuals. He argues that the information relates only to the license owner in his or her business capacity rather than in any personal capacity. In support of this position, the appellant relies on a recent decision of Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson in Order PO-2225. In that case, the requester sought access to the names of those landlords who were not corporations who owed money to the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal (the ORHT). The appellant submits that in Order PO-2225, Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson reviewed some past decisions of the Commissioner’s office and provided a rationale to be employed in making a determination as to whether information contained in a record that relates to an individual’s business activities qualifies as that individual’s personal information for the purposes of section 2(1). The appellant submits that, following the approach outlined in Order PO-2225, first step in making this determination is to decide “whether the context in which the names of individuals appeared was inherently personal or was, alternatively, of a business, professional or official government nature.” He argues that Order PO-2225 then requires an examination as to whether the disclosure of the information would reveal “something else that was inherently personal in nature which would thereby bring the information within the definition of ?personal information’.” [appellant’s emphasis]. Applying the approach employed by the Assistant Commissioner in Order PO- 2225, the appellant argues that the context in which the taxi owner’s name appears in the record is a purely business one. In support of this position, he submits that: The license owner is in the business of operating a taxicab, either directly or indirectly through its agent, lessees or assigns. Individuals who choose to enter the taxicab business are required to obtain a license. The aim of the license holder is to derive a profit, through fares or revenue generated from the lease of the license. The Respondent [the City] is responsible for issuing new licenses and maintaining records in connection with license that have already been issued. The Respondent’s records contain, among other things, the names of license owners. The fact that the license o
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Legislation
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MFIPPA
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2(1) personal information
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Subject Index
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Published
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Oct 15, 2004
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Type
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Order
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