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Summary
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NATURE OF THE APPEAL: This is an appeal from a decision of the Toronto Police Services Board (the "Police") under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ). The requester, the father of the deceased person, had sought access to "any and all information" regarding his son's sudden death. The Police located 32 responsive records and granted access to 7 records, in their entirety. The Police have provided this office with an index identifying 81 pages of records and the exemptions upon which it relied for each record. The Police denied complete access to 8 records, and partial access to 17 records, based on the exemptions at sections 8 (law enforcement), 9 (relations with other governments) and 14 (personal privacy) of the Act. During mediation of this appeal, the appellant agreed that he was not interested in the "police codes" or information that was deemed by the Police to be "non-relevant". As such, section 8(1)(l), and the following records or portions of records, are no longer at issue: record 2, record 7 (pages 12 and 19), record 10 (page 26), record 12 (page 30), record 14, record 16, record 18, record 21 (page 42) and record 31 (page 75). I sent a Notice of Inquiry to the Police initially, setting out the facts and issues in this appeal. The Police returned representations, the non-confidential portions of which were shared with the appellant. In their submissions, the Police state that they are no longer relying on the application of section 8(2)(a) to record 26 (pages 63, 64 and 65). The appellant also returned submissions. RECORDS: There are 25 records remaining at issue in this appeal consisting of police occurrence reports, witness statements, photographs, police officers' notes, a CPIC inquiry, and medical reports. The witness statements include an account of how these individuals came to be present at the scene, or information which they provided to the Police concerning the disappearance and/or sudden death of the appellant's son. DISCUSSION: RIGHT OF ACCESS BY A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE Under section 54(a), the appellant would be able to exercise the deceased's right to request and be granted access to the deceased's personal information if he is able to: demonstrate that he is the "personal representative" of the deceased; and demonstrate that his request for access "relates to the administration of the deceased's estate". Personal Representative In Order M-919, former Adjudicator Anita Fineberg reviewed the law with respect to section 54(a) and came to the following conclusions: The meaning of the term "personal representative" as it appears in section 66(a) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, the equivalent of section 54(a) of the Act , was considered by the Divisional Court in a judicial review of Order P-1027 of this office. In Adams v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner ) (1996), 136 D.L.R. (4th) 12 at 17-19, the court stated: Although there is no definition of "personal representative" in the Act, when that phrase is used in connection with a deceased and the administration of a deceased's estate, it can have only one meaning, which is the meaning set out in the definition contained in the Estates Administration Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. E.22, s.1, the Trustee Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23, s.1; and in the Succession Law Reform Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, s.1: 1(1) "personal representative" means an executor, an administrator, or an administrator with the will annexed. ... ... I am of the view that a person, in this case the appellant, would qualify as a "personal representative" under section 54(a) of the Act if he or she is "an executor, an administrator, or an administrator with the will annexed with the power and authority to administer the deceased's estate". In order for the appellant to establish that he is the deceased person's personal representative for the purposes of section 54(a), he must provide evidence of the authority to deal with his son's estate. In his letter of request to the institution, the appellant stated that he was writing as the "father and executor" of the deceased person. However, he has not provided evidence, such as letters of probate, letters of administration, or ancillary letters probate under the seal of the proper court", proving that he is the executor of his son's estate (Orders MO-1075, MO-1375, PO-1849). In the absence of supporting evidence, the appellant has not established that he is the deceased person's representative. Therefore, I find that the first requirement under section 54(a) has not been met. PERSONAL INFORMATION Section 2(1) of the Act defines "personal information", in part, as recorded information "about an identifiable individual". The records all pertain to the investigation into the disappearance and subsequent death of the appellant's son, and therefore are "about an identifiable individual". Disclosure of the information contained in the records would reveal the identities of the individuals who provided statements to the Police during the investigation. In this case, disclosure would also reveal "other personal information about the individuals", including the appellant, within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Act. The records contain the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of births of these individuals, as well as their opinions and/or views. This information is properly considered personal information as defined in the Act [paragraphs (a), (b), (d), (g) and (h)] . Section 2(2) provides that personal information does not include information about an individual who has been dead for more than 30 years. Because the deceased died in the year 2000, section 2(2) has no application in this s
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