Latest IPC Decisions

An individual asked the Municipality of Port Hope for access under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to an email sent by a municipal councillor to the police. The municipality refused to release the email because it contains the requester’s and the councillor’s personal information and disclosing it would be an unjustified invasion of the councillor’s personal privacy (s 38(b)).
In this order, the adjudicator finds that the email contains the mixed personal information of the requester and the councillor, which is intertwined so that it cannot be separated. The adjudicator finds that the councillor’s personal information is exempt under section 38(b) and upholds the municipality’s decision.

The former spouse of an individual made a request to the AGCO under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act for records about an investigation following the death of the individual. The requester stated that she was exercising a right of access on behalf of their deceased spouse under section 66(a) of the Act.
The AGCO withheld the responsive records in their entirety under sections 49(a) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information), read with law enforcement exemptions (sections 14(2)(a), 14(1)(c), and 14(1)(d)), the personal privacy exemption (section 49(b)), the solicitor-client exemption (section 19), and the third-party information exemption (section 17(1)). The AGCO also claimed that some of the records were protected under section 49(a), read with section 19 during the inquiry.
In this order, the adjudicator partially upholds the AGCO’s decision. He finds that the requester is exercising a right of access on behalf of the deceased individual. He finds that some of the records are exempt from disclosure under section 49(b), but there are portions that do not contain personal information and should be disclosed. He finds that the other records are not exempt from disclosure and orders them disclosed, with the exception of some records that are protected by sections 19 and 49(a), read with section 14(1).

The complainant asked the Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa to make several corrections to the CAS’s records for her and her children under Part X of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017. The CAS made three of the requested corrections but refused the rest. The CAS asserted it has no duty to correct the records under section 315(9) because they are not inaccurate or incomplete. It also asserted that, under section 315(10)(b), it has no duty to correct records of personal information that consist of a professional opinion or observation that was made in good faith. The complainant filed a complaint with the IPC for a review of the CAS’s refusal.

In this decision, the adjudicator upholds the CAS’s refusal of the remaining requested corrections. She accepts the CAS’s determination that the complainant has not demonstrated to its satisfaction that the records are inaccurate or incomplete, as required for the application of the duty to correct in section 315(9) of the Act. The adjudicator concludes that the CAS has granted three corrections in compliance with section 315(11) of the Act, and she issues no order.

On April 2, 2024, an individual asked the Ministry of the Solicitor General for records regarding nurses from staffing agencies used in correctional facilities. They appealed because the ministry did not issue an access decision within the required time limit. The decision-maker finds that the ministry has not issued a decision and the request is deemed to have been refused. The ministry is ordered to issue a final access decision by April 8, 2025.

An individual asked the City of Toronto for all records related to a specified property. The city searched for records in three of its divisions. The city provided the appellant with records from two divisions, withholding some information because its disclosure would be an unjustified invasion of another individual’s personal privacy (section 14(1)) or because it was non-responsive to the request. The city withheld the records from the third division in full on the basis that they were excluded from the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act due to an ongoing prosecution.

The individual appealed the city’s decision because they disagreed that the records from the third division were excluded. The individual also argued that the city narrowed the scope of the request and did not conduct appropriate search.

In this order, the adjudicator upholds the city’s decision that the ongoing prosecution exclusion applies to the records in the third division. Regarding the remainder of the request, the adjudicator finds that the city narrowed the scope of the request. The adjudicator identifies city divisions and types of records that are within the scope of the request. Further, the adjudicator finds that, except for the search within one division, the city did not conduct reasonable search for records and orders the city to conduct further searches.

This order considers the format in which a university should provide a record to an appellant for three records located after a search that was subject to previous orders. The appellant sought records from McMaster University under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act in a specified format.

The university denied the appellant access to the records in the requested specified format. In this order, the adjudicator orders the university to provide the appellant with the three responsive email records in specified format.

The City of Ottawa received a request for emails relating to two specific properties from its Planning department and Building Code and Bylaw Services, including complaints. The city located records and withheld some information claiming it should not be disclosed because it contained other individual’s personal information (sections 14(1) and 38(b)) and other information either because it contained advice and recommendations (section 7(1)) or solicitor-client privileged information (section 12). The requester appealed the city’s exemption claims and also claimed that further responsive records exist.
In this order, the adjudicator upholds the city’s decision but finds that some of the information it claimed was personal is actually professional information and orders the city to disclose that information. The adjudicator also finds that the city’s search for responsive records was reasonable.

A mother and her family received services from the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (CAST), including in relation to an incident that occurred in 2012. Later, under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA), the mother asked CAST for information in her CAST file about the incident, which she describes as an assault of one of the children by the children’s father. She specifically seeks any statements made by the children’s father and the children about the incident. The mother complained to the IPC after CAST released a number of records to her but withheld others in part or in full, including on the basis it could not release additional information about other individuals without their consent, or a court order.

During the IPC review, some of the family members consented to the release of their personal information to the mother, and CAST released additional portions of the records on this basis. Two family members did not consent to the release of their personal information to the mother.

In this decision, the adjudicator upholds CAST’s decision to withhold the remaining portions of the records from the mother. These include discrete portions consisting of the personal information of family members who do not consent to its release, which are contained in records that are not dedicated primarily to the provision of services solely to the mother. The withheld portions also contain information that post-dates and does not relate to the incident in question, and so is not responsive to the request. The adjudicator finds that CAST released to the mother all the information to which she is entitled under the CYFSA. The adjudicator dismisses the complaint.

A lawyer asked the ministry for information about a policy. The ministry located and disclosed some information. The lawyer believes the ministry has more records. In this order, the adjudicator finds that the ministry did not demonstrate that it conducted a reasonable search for records responsive to the request and orders the ministry to conduct another search.

The complainant made an access request to the clinic for all records containing his name or OHIP number. The clinic located eight pages of clinical notes and disclosed these to the complainant, but the complainant claimed that additional records exist. The adjudicator finds that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the clinic conducted a reasonable search and orders the clinic to conduct another search.

An individual asked the Financial Services Regulatory Authority of Ontario (FSRA) for a copy of a certain report that a third party had prepared for FSRA. The request was made under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. FSRA decided that it could withhold the report from disclosure under the exemption protecting advice and recommendations, found at section 13(1) of the Act. The requester appealed and raised the public interest override at section 23 of the Act. The adjudicator upholds FSRA’s decision and dismisses the appeal.

On June 23, 2024, the complainant asked a doctor at Family Care Medical Centre - Whitby (the custodian) for access to their personal health information under the Act. The complainant filed a complaint with the IPC because the custodian failed to respond to the request within the prescribed time limit. The decision-maker finds that the custodian is deemed to have refused the complainant’s access request under section 54(7) of the Act and orders the custodian to respond to the complainant by March 26, 2025.

The appellant requested records related to an Ontario Provincial Police staffing model. The ministry provided some records, including a PDF version of an Excel spreadsheet. The appellant sought access to the Excel version of the spreadsheet, but the ministry withheld it under the exemption for advice or recommendations at section 13(1).
The adjudicator finds that disclosure of the information in the spreadsheet, regardless of format, would reveal a recommendation within the meaning of section 13(1). He upholds the ministry’s exercise of discretion to disclose the PDF version only and dismisses the appeal.

The appellant made a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to The Greater/Grand Sudbury Police Services Board for access to police reports about his son’s death from a suspected drug overdose.

The police granted the appellant access to portions of the reports but refused to disclose certain information because disclosure would be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under the mandatory personal privacy exemption at section 14(1).

In this order, the adjudicator finds that there are compassionate reasons to disclose some of the deceased’s personal information to his father (section 14(4)(c)) and orders the police to disclose that information. She upholds the police’s decision to withhold the remaining information under the personal privacy exemption at section 14(1).

An individual asked the OPP for the information that it has about him.
The ministry, for the OPP, provided the individual with copies of a significant amount of OPP records, but refused access to some for a variety of reasons (exemptions) in the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. The ministry also claimed that some of the records (use of force occurrence reports) are unable to be obtained through the access provisions of the Act because of the labour relations and employment exclusion (section 65(6)).
The adjudicator does not accept the ministry’s claim that the use of force occurrence reports are excluded from the Act. However, she finds that they are exempt from disclosure to the appellant under section 49(e) (correctional records).
Regarding the remaining records, the adjudicator orders the ministry to provide the appellant with personal information that is his own or of others who have consented to its disclosure. But, she upholds the ministry’s claim that the remaining information is exempt from disclosure because it is subject to the solicitor-client privilege (section 19), law enforcement (section 14(1)(l)) or personal privacy (section 49(b)) exemptions.