Dernières décisions

Le Bureau du commissaire à l’information et à la protection de la vie privée de l’Ontario (le « CIPVP ») a reçu une plainte concernant l’utilisation par l’Université McMaster (« McMaster » ou l’« université ») du logiciel de surveillance d’examens Respondus, en vertu de la Loi sur l’accès à l’information et la protection de la vie privée (la « LAIPVP » ou la « Loi »). Ce logiciel se compose de deux applications. L’application Respondus LockDown Browser limite l’accès des utilisateurs au contenu de leur ordinateur, et l’application Respondus Monitor analyse des données audio et vidéo des étudiants au cours des examens pour déterminer s’il y a tricherie. Le plaignant ne souhaitait pas que le CIPVP communique son nom et sa plainte à l’université; la commissaire a donc ouvert un dossier de plainte concernant l’utilisation par l’université de ce logiciel de surveillance d’examens.

Ce rapport conclut que la tenue d’examens et la nomination d’examinateurs constituent des activités de l’université qui sont autorisées par la loi. La surveillance des examens en ligne pour assurer leur intégrité représente un élément approprié de la tenue de certains types d’examens, et constitue également une activité autorisée par la loi. Quant à savoir s’il est nécessaire de recueillir des renseignements personnels au moyen du logiciel de surveillance d’examens Respondus pour surveiller les examens, j’estime que l’application Respondus LockDown Browser recueille peu de renseignements personnels, et qu’elle recueille et utilise uniquement ceux qui sont nécessaires à son fonctionnement. L’application Respondus Monitor recueille des données plus délicates, dont des données biométriques, et utilise la technologie de l’intelligence artificielle (IA), ce qui est plus préoccupant. Comme les renseignements personnels recueillis par Respondus Monitor au nom de l’université sont nécessaires aux fins du fonctionnement de cet outil aux fins de la surveillance d’examens, cette collecte est autorisée en vertu du paragraphe 38 (2) de la Loi. Cependant, l’université n’a pas donné un avis suffisant de la collecte de renseignements personnels, comme l’exige le paragraphe 39 (2) de la Loi, et l’utilisation des renseignements personnels des élèves au moyen de l’application Respondus Monitor n’est pas conforme au paragraphe 41 (1). En outre, le contrat actuel entre l’université et Respondus est contraire au paragraphe 41 (1) de la Loi car il ne protège pas adéquatement tous les renseignements personnels recueillis et il permet à Respondus d’utiliser ces renseignements sans le consentement des étudiants à des fins d’amélioration du système.

Dans ce rapport, je formule à l’intention de l’université un certain nombre de recommandations pour qu’elle se conforme à la Loi. Étant donné les risques accrus qui sont associés aux technologies de l’IA, je recommande également à l’université de poser des balises supplémentaires pour encadrer son utilisation de l’application Respondus Monitor et d’assujettir en permanence l’usage de ce logiciel et tout contrat futur avec Respondus à ces mesures de protection plus strictes.

Nota : En date du 1er novembre 2024, McMaster avait donné suite aux recommandations formulées dans ce rapport à la satisfaction du CIPVP, et le dossier a été clos.

The appellant sought access to the identity of an individual who complained about the tree on the appellant’s front lawn by making a request under the Act to the City of Toronto (the city).

The city denied access to the requested information, found in records relating to a 311 call made by the complainant. It relied on the mandatory personal privacy exemption in section 14(1) of the Act to deny access to the information. In this order, the adjudicator finds that the contact and identifying information of the complainant is exempt by reason of section 14(1) and upholds the city’s decision not to disclose it.

The Township of Oro-Medonte (the township) received a three-part request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) about a certain water infrastructure issue. The township decided that it had reasonable grounds to consider the request as frivolous or vexatious under section 4(1)(b) of the Act. In this order, the adjudicator upholds the township’s decision, and dismisses the appeal.

Metrolinx received a six-part request under the Act for records relating to the Hurontario Light Rail Transit system. It issued a decision denying access, in full, to the records responsive to part 1 of the request, relying on section 14(1)(i) (security) of the Act . Metrolinx stated that there are no records responsive to the other parts of the request. At mediation, the issue of whether Metrolinx conducted a reasonable search for responsive records was added to the scope of the appeal. In this decision, the adjudicator upholds Metrolinx’s decision to withhold the records under section 14(1)(i). She finds, however, that Metrolinx’s search was not reasonable and orders it to conduct a further search for responsive records.

The requester made an access request to the Ministry of the Solicitor General (the ministry) under the Act for records about herself. The ministry located responsive records and disclosed them in part to the requester. The requester appealed the ministry’s decision on the basis that she believes that the ministry has not conducted a reasonable search for these records.

In this interim order, the adjudicator orders the ministry to conduct.

The Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Sport (the ministry) received a request for records related to a specified grant application. The ministry located responsive records and granted partial access to them, with portions withheld under sections 13(1) (advice or recommendations) and 19 (solicitor-client privilege).

In this order, the adjudicator finds that the withheld records are exempt from disclosure under sections 13(1) and 19 and dismisses the appeal.

The appellant made a request to the university for access to information about herself for a four-month period in 2017. The university located eight responsive records and granted partial access. The university denied access to record 1 under section 49(b) (personal privacy), and to records 7 and 8 under section 49(a) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information) read with section 19 (solicitor-client privilege). In this order, the adjudicator upholds the university’s decision to deny access to records 7 and 8. The adjudicator partially upholds the university's decision to deny access to record 1 and orders the university to disclose a severed version of record 1 to the appellant by removing the personal information of another individual.

Interim Order MO-4446-I resolved two of three access requests the appellant filed under the Act to the City of Belleville (the city). The requested records related to the attendance of city staff at the appellant’s property on a specified date. In Interim Order MO-4446-I, the adjudicator ordered the city to conduct a further search for records responsive to the appellant’s request. In accordance with Interim Order MO-4446-I, the city conducted a further search and located an updated record. The appellant continued to take the position that additional records should exist. In this final order, the adjudicator finds that the city’s further search was reasonable and dismisses the appeal.

This order deals with a third party appeal of an access decision under the Act made by the Ministry of Health (the ministry). The request was for records relating to the third party’s community laboratory business, namely records relating to the development, review and implementation of external reviews and to the implementation of a specific funding cut. The ministry decided to disclose the responsive information in part. The appellant claims the application of the mandatory third-party information exemption in section 17(1) of the Act to specific commercial and/or financial information that the ministry had decided to disclose. In this order, the adjudicator finds that the appellant has not established that disclosure of the withheld information would result in any of the harms set out in section 17(1). The ministry is ordered to disclose the records to the requester in accordance with its decision.

The appellant made a request to the university for access to information about herself in relation to a specific event and meeting held on campus. The university denied access to 15 of 28 responsive records based on section 49(a) (right to refuse access to requester’s own personal information), read with section 19 (solicitor-client privilege). In this order, the adjudicator finds all the withheld records are communications that are solicitor-client privileged and are therefore exempt under section 49(a) read with section 19(a). She upholds the university’s decision and dismisses the appeal.

The appellant made a request to the university for access to information about herself. The university issued a decision granting partial access to responsive records. The university denied access to some responsive records based on section 49(a) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information), read with section 19 (solicitor-client privilege). In this order, the adjudicator finds that the records contain the appellant’s personal information but contain communications that are solicitor-client privileged and are therefore exempt under section 49(a), read with section 19(a). She upholds the university’s decision and dismisses the appeal.

The appellant alleges that the Toronto Police Services Board (the police) failed to conduct a reasonable search for records responsive to his request made under the Act for records relating to him, including all videos pertaining to a specified occurrence report. The adjudicator finds that the police conducted a reasonable search for responsive records within their custody or control. The appeal is dismissed.

The Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks (the ministry) received a request under the Act for access to records provided to or sent from the ministry to the Office of the Mayor of the City of Sault Ste. Marie and to the office of a named M.P.P. at the City of Sault Ste. Marie between 2019 to 2020.

The ministry issued an access decision advising that it had not located responsive records. The appellant appealed this access decision to the IPC on the basis that the ministry did not conduct a reasonable search for responsive records.

In this interim order, the adjudicator determines that the ministry has not provided sufficient evidence to established that it conducted a reasonable search for responsive records. Therefore, she orders the ministry to conduct further searches and to provide affidavit evidence detailing its efforts to search for and locate responsive records.

The Township of Wainfleet received a request under the Act for access to records relating to a septic system inspection at a specified address. The property owner objected to disclosure of the responsive records and the township decided to deny access to the records citing the exemption in section 14(1) (personal privacy). The requester appealed the township’s decision, confirming that she was not interested in any personal information in the records. The township maintained its decision not to release the records.

In this order, the adjudicator finds that the information remaining at issue is not exempt under section 14(1). The adjudicator allows the appeal and orders the township to disclose the records with names and contact information severed.

The Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (the IPC) received a privacy complaint from a children’s aid society about the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) disclosing personal information contrary to the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA or the Act). The children’s aid society stated that the OPP had implemented new reporting system software (Child Protection Agency Notification Plug-in) and since that time, had sent several occurrence reports in which a youth was listed a witness or victim of a serious crime, but where there was no indication of a child protection concern. The children’s aid society stated that the OPP should not send reports absent a child protection concern, and that to do so was a breach of the youth’s privacy. The IPC opened a Commissioner-initiated privacy complaint file against the Ministry of the Solicitor General (the ministry), the ministry responsible for the OPP, regarding the use of the reporting system noted above.

In this report, I find that the guidance the ministry provided for use of the Child Protection Agency Notification Plug-in is contrary to section 125 of the Child, Youth, and Family Services Act (CYFSA) and section 42 of FIPPA. Section 125 of the CYFSA sets out a number of harms or risks to children and imposes a duty to report in cases where an individual, including an OPP officer, has reasonable grounds to suspect one or more of those harms or risks. The guidance provided by the ministry requires officers to send a report to a children’s aid society in all cases where a youth is listed as a victim or witness to a serious crime. Mandating these disclosures, rather than having the officer use their judgment as to whether a duty to report exists under section 125 of the CYFSA, allows for the possibility that the OPP may disclose personal information to a children’s aid society when there is no duty to report, which would be contrary to the Act. I recommend that the ministry change its guidance to reflect that officers are to send reports to a children’s aid society when the officer judges they have a duty to report, and to remove guidance stating that such reports are mandatory when a youth is listed as a victim or a witness.